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EVOLUTIONARY ENFORCEMENT AT THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Jayne W Barnard" 
Hundreds of critics in the past eighteen months have heaped abuse on the SEC 
Enforcement Division. How could the Division have missed so much misbehavior 
on Wall Street? How could the Division's young lawyers have been charmed by 
Bernie Madoff and thwarted from discovering his terrible crimes? 
Most critics seem to agree that the Division's most urgent needs include 
developing substantially more financial sophistication among Division lawyers and 
investigators; better communications within the Commission and with other federal 
agencies; and a meaningful system for handling tips and processing information. 
The SEC's response to its critics has been remarkable. The Commission has 
enlisted an energetic cadre of former federal prosecutors to lead the Division. They 
have redeployed comfortable, desk-bound middle managers back into the field to 
investigate market misconduct. Reversing the Commission's tradition of micro-
management, they have given senior lawyers new authority to issue subpoenas and 
initiate settlements. A major reorganization plan is already underway. 
The SEC, in short, is in the midst of"the most significant revamp of the division 
in the last 30 years." This Article begins with the optimistic hope that the current 
reorganization is successful in meeting the most urgent needs of the Division. It then 
sketches out six suggestions for further improving the Enforcement Division: a 
bounty program to compensate informants who come forward with useful 
information; a victim services unit; a proposal to develop behavioral expertise within 
the Division; a surveillance and monitoring program for defendants demonstrating 
a recidivist profile; a sanction policy for individuals that is proportionate, 
progressive, remedial, and real; and regular publication of meaningful data regarding 
losses from fraud in the securities markets. 
Many people in the past eighteen months have expressed their fury at the 
failures of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Some of the most 
impassioned criticisms have been directed at the SEC's Enforcement Division. 
Critics have lambasted Enforcement for failure to employ modem data-mining 
techniques in order to sniff out fraudulent online investment schemes; failure 
to respond to credible evidence of fraud because Enforcement lawyers and 
• James Goold Cutler Professor of Law and Herbert V. Kelly, Sr., Professor for Teaching 
Excellence (2009-1 0), William & Mary Law School. Thanks to Josh Booth 3L and Brittany Mohler 2L for 
their research and cite-checking assistance on this project. Trevor Hall, William& Mary class of2009, wrote 
an excellent seminar paper for me in 2008 that very much informs my "no second chance" rule. Janice Craft, 
class of2010, discussed victim advocacy practices with me. Three good friends, all alumni of the SEC 
Enforcement Division, brainstormed with me (anonymously) about portions of this Article. As always, John 
Tucker provided incisive editorial comments. Special thanks to Peter Oh for organizing this excellent 
symposium. 
403 
HeinOnline -- 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 404 2009-2010
404 UNIVERSITY OF PITISBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:403 
investigators lacked the financial sophistication to understand complex 
transactions and modem trading techniques; failure to interact and exchange 
infonnation with other SEC divisions and other federal regulators; failure to 
deploy adequate resources to deal with complex investigations; and 
management failures in assignment and prosecution of specific Enforcement 
cases. 
Some critics also think the Division has spent so much time on "little" 
cases and "little" defendants that it has missed the forest for the trees. 1 Critics 
and supporters alike have offered many suggestions for reform of the 
Enforcement Division. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has urged the SEC to 
develop a knowledge management program to facilitate intra-agency exchange 
of information. 2 The Government Accountability Office has recommended that 
the Enforcement Division revisit the "level and mix of resources available to 
investigative staff in the areas of administrative and paralegal support, 
specialized services and expertise, and information technology support. "3 
Recently, the SEC's own Inspector General identified multiple failures in 
the SEC's handling of allegations against Ponzi schemer Bernie Madoff. In a 
wide-ranging critique of the Commission's unproductive investigations of 
Madoff spanning nearly two decades, the Inspector General noted the lack of 
training for young lawyers with little knowledge of the securities markets,4 
"inexperienced Enforcement staff,"5 and lack of essential follow-up in 
conducting investigations. 6 His recommendations for reform of the Division 
included such obvious items as more training, better procedures for the 
handling of tips and complaints, ensuring that enforcement teams have at least 
one team member with experience and expertise (such as in dealing with Ponzi 
I. See generally Joe Nocera, S.E.C. Chased Small Fry While Big Fish, Mado./f. Swam Free, N.Y. 
nMES, June 27,2009, at Bl. 
2. CTR. FOR CAPITAL MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS, EXAMINING THE EFFICIENCY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 23 (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://www .uschamber.com/assets/ccmc/090211 ccmc _sec_ speed.pdf(last visited Feb. 16, 20 I 0). Jonathan 
G. Katz, former Secretary of the SEC, was commissioned by the Chamber of Commerce to conduct this 
report and make recommendations. 
3. GAO, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: 
GREATER ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES IN THE 
DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 50 (March 2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09358.pdf. 
4. U.S.SEc.&ExcH.CoMM'NOFFICEOFINVESTIGATIONs,INVESTIGATIONOFFAILUREOFTHESEC 
TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME-PUBLIC VERSION 29 (Aug. 31, 2009), http:// 
sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OFF AlLURE]. 
5. /d. at 24. 
6. /d. at 34, 39,41 and 310. 
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schemes), better supervision, and more consistent attention to staff concerns 
about internal communications and managerial support. 7 
The SEC's new Chairman, Mary Schapiro, has responded to these and 
other recommendations by hiring "tough cops" from outside the agency to 
head the Enforcement Division.8 The new Enforcement Division director, 
Robert Khuzami, has altered the Division's performance metrics to emphasize 
"quality, timeliness and deterrent impact" rather than simply the number of 
cases initiated.9 He has also decreased the levels of bureaucracy by stripping 
out a layer of middle management in the Enforcement Division}0 
Significantly, Khuzami recently reorganized the Division into practice groups 
to emphasize transaction-specific expertise. 11 Khuzami has acknowledged the 
need for both meaningful and visible reforms in the Division. He has also 
acknowledged a "sense ofurgency" in getting the Division back on track. 12 
This Article begins by recognizing the significant shake-up that has 
already occurred within the Enforcement Division under Khuzami's 
leadership. 13 It acknowledges that no reforms are more urgently needed than 
building up the staff's ability to understand today's sophisticated financial 
markets; decipher complicated structured investment products; receive, triage, 
and process information from informants; and have the training and resources 
necessary to be able to enforce the law in a challenging, competitive, 
internationalized, and rapidly-changing economic environment. 
This Article operates under the assumption (which may tum out to be 
wildly optimistic) that the most urgent reforms in the Division-building 
expertise and keeping motivation high-will be implemented successfully. It 
then sketches out several additional suggestions for further improving the 
Division's enforcement efforts. These suggestions include: (1) a bounty 
program to compensate informants who come forward with useful information; 
7. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF AUDITS, PROGRAM 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED WITHIN THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION (Sept. 29, 2009}, http://www.sec-oig 
.gov/Reports/ Auditslnspections/2009/467 .pdf. 
8. See infra Part I and accompanying text. 
9. Yin Wilczek, Khuzami Cites Move to Specialized Teams, Other Initiatives to Improve SEC 
Enforcement, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 849 (May II, 2009). 
10. Yin Wilczek, In Mid-Year Reviews, Lawyers Give Enforcement Division High Marks for 
Revamp, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1362 (July 20, 2009). 
II. John Herzfeld & Phyllis Diamond, Khuzami Unveils Broad Reorganization of Enforcement 
Div'n, New Subpoena Powers, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1473 (Aug. 20, 2009). 
12. Kara Scannell, "Urgency" Drives SEC Crackdown, WALL Sr. J., Aug. II, 2009, at Cl. 
13. Yin Wilczek, Specialized Units Should Be in Place By Beginning of New Year, SEC Official 
Says, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1777 (Sept. 28, 2009) ("The shake-up is said to be "the most 
significant revamp of the division in the last 30 years."); see infra Part I. 
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(2) a victim services unit within the Enforcement Division; (3) a proposal to 
add behavioral expertise to the investigational resources ofthe Division; (4) 
a surveillance and monitoring program for offenders demonstrating a recidivist 
profile; (5) a sanction policy for individual defendants that is proportionate, 
progressive, remedial, and real; and ( 6) regular publication of meaningful data 
regarding losses from fraud in the securities markets. 14 Each ofthese proposals 
would strengthen the Enforcement Division and assist in its mission of 
protecting investors. 
I. A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
ENFORCEMENT DMSION 
The Enforcement Division has undergone a radical transformation since 
Mary Schapiro was sworn in as SEC Chairman in January, 2009. Not only did 
Schapiro quickly cashier and replace long-time Division ChiefLinda Chatman 
Thomsen. 15 Both the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate 
Banking Committee convened public hearings to explore the myriad failings 
of the Division (and other units of the Commission) throughout the preceding 
decade. 16 Ironically, there were no Congressional hearings when the previous 
SEC Chairman set up a series of procedures that hobbled the Enforcement 
Division.17 
The Commission very quickly appointed three key players to lead the 
Enforcement Division: (1) Robert Khuzami, a former prosecutor in the U.S. 
Attorney's office for the Southern District ofNew York and, at the time of his 
appointment, General Counsel for the Americas at Deutsche Bank AG; 18 (2) 
George Canellos, former Chief of the Major Crimes Unit in the U.S. 
Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York and, at the time of his 
appointment, a partner in the New York firm ofMilbank, Tweed, Hadley & 
14. See infra Parts II-VII, respectively. 
15. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Enforcement Dir. Linda Chatman Thomsen to 
Leave SEC (Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-22.htm. 
16. See generally Madofflnvestment Securities Fraud: Regulatory and Oversight Concerns and the 
Need for Reform: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Ill th Cong. (Jan. 27, 
2009); see generally Assessing the MadoffPonzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the H. 
Financial Services Comm., Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises Hearing, Ill th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2009). 
17. See Otis Bilodeau, SEC's Cox Tightens Reins on Enforcement Division, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060 l 087 &sid=aodWCvu220YE&refer=home. 
18. Khuzami Will Lead SEC Enforcement Division, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20,2009, at C3; Press Release, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Robert Khuzami Named SEC Director ofEnforcement (Feb. 19, 
2009), http://www .sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-Jl.htm. 
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McCloy;19 and (3) Lorin Reisner, also a former prosecutor and, at the time of 
his appointment, a partner in Debevoise & Plimpton LLC.20 They walked into 
a Division that was under-resourced, demoralized, and insecure.21 
Khuzami immediately began to talk about some of the Division's most 
needed reforms: More trial lawyers, more paralegals, and better information 
technology. 22 Chairman Schapiro floated the idea of a "fraud college" to train 
the staff to better spot market abuses. 23 Inevitably, the Enforcement staff felt 
both pride and fear as the Division unveiled its management changes.24 
In August of2009, Khuzami reflected on the early days ofhis leadership 
during a major policy speech to the Association of the Bar of the City ofNew 
York.25 He cited increased activity in the Division (based on numbers of 
investigations opened and cases filed); the "flattening of management" by 
redeploying branch chiefs to handle less paper and conduct more on-the-
ground investigations; delegation of power to senior lawyers in the regional 
branches to handle "routine case decisions"; delegation to the same senior 
lawyers of the power to initiate formal investigations with accompanying 
subpoena power; and streamlining the cumbersome "Action Memo" process 
(seeking authorization from the full Commission).26 
On August 31, 2009, the SEC's Inspector General issued an 
unprecedented report examining dozens of contacts between the Commission 
19. Kara Scannell, Cane/los to Run SEC in New York, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2009, at C3; Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm 'n, George S. Canellos Named as Regional Director of SEC Regional 
Office (June 2, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news!press/2009/2009-125.htm. 
20. Kara Scannell, SEC Names Deputy Enforcement Director, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2009, available 
athttp://online.wsj.comlarticle_emaiVSB124656228827387801-IMyQjAxMDI5NDE2MjUxNjlyWj.html; 
Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Lorin L. Reisner to Join SEC Enforcement Division (July 2, 
2009), http://www .sec.gov/news!press/2009/2009-150.htm. 
21. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in 
Search of a Story (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 1475433, 2009), available at 
http://scholarship.law .georgetown.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article= lll8&context=fwps __papers (noting the 
inevitable limitations imposed on SEC enforcement staff and the beleaguered mindset that results). 
22. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, The SEC in Transition: A Mid-Year Review ofSEC Enforcement 
in 2009, (July 9, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications!Pages/SECinTransition-MidY earReview-
SECEnforcement.aspx. 
23. Joshua Gallu & Dawn Kopecki, SEC May Send Staff to "Fraud College" to Detect Future 
Madoffs, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps!news?pid=20601087&sid= 
a06As7nsq.wo. 
24. Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Upsets Some as It Tries to Sharpen Teeth: Several Moves Draw In-
House Criticism, WASH. POST, July 15,2009, at Al3. 
25. Robert Khuzami, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the New York City Bar: My 
First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news!speech/2009/ 
spch080509rk.htm [hereinafter Khuzami, My First Hundred Days). 
26. Id 
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staff and Bernie Madoff over a sixteen-year period. 27 His conclusions were 
blistering, both about the failures of the Enforcement Division and those of the 
SEC's Office of Compliance Investigations and Examinations (OCIE). The 
Senate Banking Committee quickly reconvened to heap more abuse onto the 
Division and its lawyers.28 A few weeks later, the Commission itself released 
a new Strategic Plan, setting ambitious goals-such as a 90% "success" rate 
and no more than 8% employee turnover-for the Enforcement Division. 29 
The most constructive development during this tumultuous year has 
undoubtedly been the decision to re-engineer the Division to promote 
communication, continuity, and expertise. As early as April, 2009, the 
Division's new leaders signaled that they would establish teams of specialists 
to focus on particular types of fraud schemes. 30 In August, 2009, they unveiled 
the new structure, announcing the creation of five specialized units: Asset 
Management (focusing on investment advisers, investment companies, hedge 
funds, and private equity funds); Market Abuse (focusing on large-scale 
market abuses and complex manipulation schemes by institutional traders, 
market professionals, and others); Structured and New Products (focusing on 
complex derivatives and financial products, including credit default swaps, 
collateralized debt obligations, and securitized products); Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act; and Municipal Securities and Public Pensions.31 
In addition, the SEC will create an Office of Market Intelligence that will 
be responsible for "the collection, analysis, risk-weighing, triage, referral and 
monitoring ofthe hundreds of thousands of tips, complaints and referrals that 
the Agency receives each year.'m And the Enforcement Division will appoint 
a chief operating officer who will "manage information technology, oversee 
project management and build efficient workflow processes.'m 
In announcing this reorganization, the Division's new Director, Robert 
Khuzami, also emphasized a number of other themes: focusing on cases 
27. See INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE, supra note 4. 
28. See Madofflnvestment Securities Fraud· Regulatory and Oversight Concerns and the Need for 
Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Ban/cing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, I lith Cong. (Sept. 10, 
2009) (Opening Statement of Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman), available at http://banking 
.senate.gov/publiclindex.cfrn?FuseAction=Newsroom.PressReleases&ContentRecord _id=a5f88d 12-b340-
0844-534a-166a8de98523. 
29. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Publishes 2010-2015 Draft Strategic Plan for 
Public Comment (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009!2009-216.htm. 
30. Kara Scannell, SEC Plans Crime Fight With Teams of Specialists, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2009, 
atCI. 
31. Herzfeld & Diamond, supra note II. 
32. Khuzami, My First Hundred Days, supra note 25. 
33. Id 
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involving the "greatest and most immediate harm" and on cases that send "an 
outsized message of deterrence"; working to "better determine on an informed 
basis whether to continue an investigation"; and "building strong cases so that 
defendants [will] settle quickly."34 Khuzami's ultimate goal, he said, was for 
the Division to be more "nimble." We need "to move our cases more quickly 
and to free up time and resources to take on new matters with greater urgency 
and impact. "35 
Khuzami deserves cautious praise for these initiatives. Re-inventing a 
complex, lawyer-heavy workplace is a huge undertaking, and it may fail. 
Assume, however, that these initiatives are successful. What else might the 
Enforcement Division do? 
II. THE SEC SHOULD IMPLEMENT A BOUNTY PROGRAM FOR INFORMANTS 
WHO COME FORWARD WITH USEFUL INFORMATION 
People in the financial industry are singularly motivated by wealth. Yet, 
in case after case where observant participants must have known about 
financial wrongdoing, nobody came forward. Nobody blew the whistle.36 
Why? Because there was little reason to do so. Whistleblowing is generally 
thankless and painful. 37 It is time to create an SEC bounty program to reward 
people who come forward with useful information about fraud. 
The SEC already has statutory authority to pay bounties to informants 
who provide information about insider trading. 38 This bounty authority has 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. See, e.g., MALCOLM SALTER, INNOV A TJON CORRUPTED: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF ENRON'S 
COLLAPSE 125 (2008) ("Many employees were apparently well aware ofEnron's dissimulations-some 
even joked about their pervasiveness. According to vice president Sherron Watkins, the giant green overlay 
on the lush tropical scene on the cover of Enron 's 1997 annual report quickly became known internally as 
'the fig lear obscuring the company's fmancial status and performance."). 
3 7. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp,Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REv. 91, 95 (2007) (enumerating the 
disincentives typically faced by whistleblowers, including the possibility of destroying the company for 
which they work, fear of blacklisting from future employers, fear of social ostracism, and psychological 
burdens). 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(l)(e) (2006). 
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rarely been used. 39 This fact may not be surprising since there is a history of 
antipathy to paying such bounties within the Enforcement Division.40 
The SEC's own Inspector General, however, has recently urged the 
Commission to seek Congressional authority to create a new bounty program 
that would pay for information about any securities law violation. Such a 
program, he says, would provide the necessary incentives for people with 
knowledge (or even well-founded suspicion) to bring forward information 
about possible illegal activity.41 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has also 
suggested she favors a broader bounty program. "Right now, the main reward 
for being a whistleblower is the good feeling you get of having done 
something important, because we don't have the authority to pay," she told the 
House Appropriations Committee.42 She favors the notion of a broad-spectrum 
bounty program, because "[ w ]histleblowers tend to do a lot of the work for 
you, hand you something that's pretty fully baked.'>43 
Professor Pamela Bucy has been even more specific about the value of 
informants and the need for financial incentives to encourage them to come 
forward: 
Public regulators, law enforcement, administrative agencies cannot effectively 
detect, prove, or deter complex economic wrongdoing without inside information. 
It is just too hard to piece together what is wrong . 
• • * 
I practiced as an Assistant United States Attorney from 1980 to 1987 .... I worked 
with agents to investigate and then prove white collar crimes. Most of our 
investigations of white collar cases took a couple of years. They were tedious, 
39. One researcher reports that the SEC has paid only four bounties since 1989. He describes the 
SEC's program as "all but ignored and unused for its 20+ year history." Bruce Carton, New Opportunities 
for Bounty Hunters, COMPLIANCE WK., July 3, 2009, http://www.complianceweek.com/blog/carton/2009/ 
07/03/new-opportunities-for-sec-bounty-hunters/. 
40. When the possibility of SEC bounty authority first surfaced in Congress in 1988, the prospect 
caused considerable alarm within the Commission's enforcement staff: According to Lawrence Iason, 
Regional Administrator of the SEC's New York office, the bounty provision will create so much havoc, the 
agency should consider never using it: "The Commission should consider taking the position it will never 
enter into these arrangements." The New York chief said the SEC already receives tips from informants, 
some of them valuable and many of them worthless, but with the new legislation, people will be coming out 
of the woodwork with allegations. "Staff will be overburdened trying to sort out which leads to pursue, 
determining in successful cases who is entitled to the money, and defending its actions in court," he said. 
Barbara Franklin, Mutiny Over the Bounty? SEC Lukewarm on New Investigative Tool From Congress, N.Y. 
L.J.,Nov.l7, 1988,at5. 
41. Joanna Chung, SEC Urged to Reward Whistleblowers, FIN. DMES, July I, 2009, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/ffeb6ef4-6665-llde-a034-00 144feabdcO.html?nclick _check= I. 
42. David R. Sands,Feds Might Offer Bounties for Market Miscreants, WASH. DMEs, Mar. 12,2009, 
at AOI. 
43. !d. 
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laborious, slow step-by-step investigations. We would get some information, maybe 
from a victim, maybe from a competitor, that something was wrong. But we 
certainly didn't have enough information to figure it out. 
We would seek grand jury subpoenas for some records. From those records we 
would get an idea of what bank accounts might be involved, then we subpoenaed 
those bank accounts, look on the back of the checks, see where those checks were 
going. 
The grand jury would issue more subpoenas. 
And then when we got to the point of actually talking to some witnesses, we never 
were sure if we were starting with the right ones. If we started interviews with 
someone who had more liability than we thought, we had records destroyed or 
altered. Those witnesses would walk out of the interview and boom, the records were 
gone, or altered. 
The point is, without an insider to guide an investigation, detecting, investigating and 
proving complex wrongdoing is very difficult.44 
411 
Many, many federal agencies have had success with bounty programs. 
The IRS, for example, has collected hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid 
taxes based on information received from informants under its bounty 
program.45 Other federal agencies, too, provide models of effective bounty 
programs. The government pays bounties for information about unlawful 
behavior in government contracting.46 It also pays bounties for information 
about violations of the federal banking laws, 47 the Clean Air Act,48 CERCLA, 49 
44. Interview with Pamela Bucy, Professor of Law, Univ. of Ala. Sch. of Law, Tuscaloosa, Ala., in 
Corp. Crime Rep. (May 20, 2002); see also Pamela Bucy,PrivateJustice, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. I, 55 (2002) 
("Economic wrongdoing is difficult to detect and prove. Often, it is hidden within a large organization, 
buried in paper trails and electronic messages, concealed by false documentation, involves complex and 
intricate transactions, and has many participants, none of whom may know the full extent of the conduct or 
even, for some, that there are any improprieties. Reconstruction of the illegality requires sophisticated 
investigators and attorneys with significant investigative resources and legal skill."). 
45. See IRS WHISTLEBLOWER ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/ 
whistle blower_ annual_ report. pdf 
46. Major Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(2006). 
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(t) (2006) (indicating payment of up to $10,000 for information leading to a 
conviction or imposition of a civil penalty). 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9609(d) (2006) (indicating payment of up to $10,000 for information leading to a 
conviction). 
HeinOnline -- 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 412 2009-2010
412 UNIVERSITY OF PIITSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:403 
the customs laws,50 the drug laws, 51 and the U.S. Postal Service rules. 52 There 
are, in fact, dozens ofbounty provisions scattered throughout the U.S. Code. 53 
There are some drawbacks, of course, to the use of bounty programs. The 
biggest objection to adoption of an SEC bounty program, as was the case in 
1988,54 will be that the Enforcement Division already receives more tips than 
it can reasonably handle. The single greatest failure in the SEC's involvement 
with Bernie Mad off, for example, was the Division's failure to understand and 
pursue the information brought to it (repeatedly) by Harry Markopolos. 
(Ironically, Markopolos was driven, in part, by a mistaken belief that he would 
be entitled to a bounty for the information he shared with Enforcement staff 
lawyers.)55 If the Division does not have the resources-or the analytical 
capacity-to handle existing tips about securities fraud, then generating more 
tips can only make matters worse. Therefore, any meaningful proposal for a 
bounty program must be preceded by the creation of a tip-handling system that 
is capable of recognizing the kinds of information that are worthy of further 
pursuit. We can only hope that the new Office ofMarket Intelligence can meet 
that threshold requirement. 
Even assuming a workable tip-handling apparatus is in place, however, 
bounty programs can still create problems. Bounty programs may be 
inefficient, giving rise to specious tips, for example, or encouraging people to 
"save up" information rather than taking steps to correct the misconduct of 
which they are aware. Bounty programs may also discourage law enforcement 
officials from aggressively pursuing their own investigations-it is always 
50. 19 U.S.C. § 1619 (2006) (authorizing payments of up to 25% of the fme or duties collected or 
25% of the value of the confiscated property to any person who provides information that leads to collection 
of unpaid customs duties or any fme, penalty, or forfeiture of property). 
51 . D.E.A. AGENTS MANUAL § 6612.44A.2 (Mar. 24, 1999) (permitting payments for information 
or assistance leading to a criminal or civil forfeiture of illegal drugs, based on the value of the forfeited 
items). 
52. United States Postal Service, Poster 296-Notice of Reward (July 2006), http://www.usps.com/ 
cpimlftp/posters/pos296/welcome.htm (offering rewards up to $100,000 for information about violations 
of the postal regulations). 
53. Perhaps the best-known federal bounty program is the False Claims Act, which is regularly cited 
for its multi-million dollar bounties. See. e.g., Gardiner Harris, Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion to Settle Inquiry 
Over Marketing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at 84 (noting that a salesman who became a whistleblower 
under the False Claims Act received more than $50 million for his role in the case and that a total of $102 
million in bounties was paid to informants). 
54. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
55. See ANDREW KIRTZMAN, BETRAYAL: THE LIFE AND LIES OF BERNIE MAIX>FF 85-86 (2009) 
(noting Markopolos' belief that his information might "make him a millionaire"). In his fLrst meeting with 
the SEC, he said, "[i]fthere is a reward for uncovering fraud, I certainly deserve to be compensated[.]" Jd 
at 101. 
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easier to wait for an informant to come forward with a package of evidence 
than to go through the gritty kind of investigation, document review, and 
transactional reconstruction required to build a securities fraud case. Bounties 
may also increase demands on regulatory staff, who not only have to sift 
through informants' tips, but also may have to determine just how much a 
piece of information is worth (this may be particularly difficult when 
confronted with the claims of multiple informants). It is possible, indeed 
likely, that the Enforcement Division would need to create a special task force 
or unit simply to deal with the expectations of informants. The staff would not 
only need to sort out the meritorious from the unmeritorious tips, but it might 
also need to determine the relationship(s) between the informant(s) and the 
scheme(s).56 
Some critics object to bounty payments because they monetize virtue. 
And, inasmuch as they discourage voluntary whistleblowing, bounties may 
also undermine the public's respect for the law. In the debates leading up to 
the enactment of the bounty provision of the Major Fraud Act, for example, 
one senator seriously condemned the program as a form of"bribe."57 
Finally, some critics have cautioned that "encouraging citizens to be 
informers would create an insidious climate of betrayal and mistrust 
throughout society."58 As one commentator has put it, when we rely on bounty 
programs we put ourselves at risk ofbecoming a "nation ofsnitches."59 This 
seems to me to be a particularly unpersuasive argument. Is it better that people 
ignore ongoing frauds than that, as a society, we encourage those people to 
speak up and shut the frauds down? And just how much damage is done to the 
social fabric when we reward whistleblowers for thwarting economic crimes? 
I would argue, "not much." We live, after all, in a Panopticon culture. Our 
friends and coworkers may already be watching every move we make.60 
And what about the many advantages of bounty programs? As Professor 
Bucy suggests, bounty programs reduce the cost of law enforcement 
investigations. They are not only instrumental in bringing forth hidden 
information-sometimes deeply camouflaged information-at a comparatively 
56. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
57. 135 CONG. REc. S3314, S3319 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1998)(statement of Sen. Dale Bumpers). 
58. IRWIN Ross, SHADY BUSINESS 139 (1992). 
59. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial 
Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VJLL. L. REv. 273, 318 (1992). 
60. See HAL NIEDZVIECKJ, THE PEEP DIARIES: HOW WE'RE LEARNING TO LOVE WATCHING 
OURSELVES AND OUR NEIGHBORS (2009). 
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low cost. They also cost nothing if the information received is not productive. 
This is win-win law enforcement. 
There are other advantages to informant bounty programs: they enhance 
the likelihood of detection of wrongdoing and, thus, serve to deter some 
frauds. Unlike substantive regulation, bounty programs act as a deterrent to 
fraud without interfering in the legitimate process of capital accumulation; 
when properly designed, they encourage informants to gather information, 
analyze what they know, seek out additional documentation, and organize the 
information in a useful and comprehensible form; they provide an outlet for 
employees who have been ordered to participate in wrongdoing and have lost 
or fear for their jobs for refusal to go along.61 Bounties generate access to 
information that otherwise might never come to the attention of the law 
enforcement agency, especially in circumstances where victims of fraud might 
not yet know they have been defrauded. In addition, by focusing law 
enforcement agencies on "true" problems rather than imagined or possible 
problems, they reduce the cost not only for the enforcing agency but also for 
defendants who must respond to inquiries and organize a defense. 
The existing SEC program for information about insider trading provides 
for an award ofup to 10% of the proceeds to an informant whose information 
leads to the imposition of a civil penalty. 62 This award is discretionary with the 
SEC and is not subject to judicial review.63 It is unavailable to law 
enforcement officials who discover evidence of fraud in the course of their 
duties. 64 The Commission's Inspector General has indicated that he would like 
to use the existing SEC program as a model, with a couple of interesting 
tweaks.65 
61. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act whistleblower provisions are also aimed at this population, but have 
proven an inadequate incentive to induce whistleblowers to come forward. See Rapp, supra note 37, at 116. 
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e) (2006). 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e). 
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e). 
65. See Letter from H. David Kotz, SEC Inspector Gen., to Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski (June 30, 
2009), http://kanjorski.house.gov/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view&id= 1571 &Itemid= 1.: 
HeinOnline -- 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 415 2009-2010
2010] EVOLUTIONARY ENFORCEMENT 415 
Another model for a bounty program is that created under the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). 66 This 
statute, passed in the wake of the savings and loan crisis, contains a multi-
layered program for the payment of bounties to informants. It is, among other 
things, markedly more generous than the SEC's current program. First, 
informants who provide original information about banking law violations that 
lead to recovery of a criminal fine, restitution, or civil penalty may be entitled 
to recover up to 25% of the amount recovered, or $100,000, whichever is 
less. 67 As with the current SEC program, bounties are not available under this 
provision to employees of the government who come into possession of the 
information in the course of their regular duties.68 Importantly, they are also 
unavailable to individuals who knowingly participated in the wrongdoing. 69 
Second, informants who come forward with information about bank fraud 
that is critical to a criminal conviction may be entitled to receive a reward.70 
In addition, if the conviction results in a recovery of funds, the informant may 
also share in the recovery as follows: 20-30% ofthe first $1 million; 10-20% 
of the next $4 million; and 5-10 percent of the next $5 million. 71 Third, 
informants who provide information that leads to the recovery of a defendant's 
assets have a right to share in the recovery based on the same formula used for 
those who provide information on the merits. 72 
There are other models, too, that might form the basis for a comprehensive 
SEC bounty program.73 What is most important, however, is not the details of 
/d. 
We would recommend that the Exchange Act be amended to authorize the SEC to award a 
bounty for information leading to the recovery of a civil penalty from any violator of the federal 
securities laws, not simply insider trading violations. We would also suggest that the Exchange 
Act be amended to provide specific criteria for awarding bounties, including a provision that 
where a whistleblower relies upon public information, such reliance does not constitute an 
absolute bar to recovering a bounty. The statute should also require that the whistleblower be 
provided with status reports at certain milestones during the investigation or examination that 
was based on the tip. 
66. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Actof1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, I 03 
Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.). 
67. 12 u.s.c. § l83lk(b)(2006). 
68. 12 U.S.C. § l83lk(c)(2006). 
69. 12 U.S.C. § l83lk(c). 
70. 12 u.s.c. § 4205 (2006). 
71. 12 u.s.c. § 4205. 
72. 12 U.S.C. § 4225(c) (2006). 
73. A particularly thoughtful proposal for a bounty program appears in Marsha I. Ferziger & Daniel 
G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 
1999 U.ILL. L. REv. 1141 (examining several federal programs and proposing a "model" bounty program 
that would include: ( l) clarity about eligibility for a bounty; (2) certainty of payment, rather than discretion 
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how the program would run, but rather obtaining the authority to establish 
such a program and a commitment within the Enforcement Division to provide 
a reward for useful information. 
III. THE SEC SHOULD ESTABLISH A VICTIM SERVICES UNIT 
The SEC has long taken the position that it is not a collection agency for 
victims of securities fraud. Still, in recent years (and with the prodding of 
Congress), the Commission has vastly improved its record of distributing the 
proceeds of disgorgement recoveries to victims. 74 In this respect, the 
Commission is already providing a critical service for many victims, but it 
could and should do much more. 
Let us begin with the proposition that victims of fraud can suffer terribly 
from their victimization. They not only lose money, they can also lose self-
respect, their status in the community, their sense of trust, their sense of value 
to their family, psychological well-being, physical health, hopes for the future, 
a sense of accomplishment (as evidenced by the wealth they've accumulated 
over a lifetime), and a sense of competence to manage their own affairs. Many 
victims of fraud are simply destroyed.75 
Not insignificantly, many fraud victims redirect their anger and shame 
from the perpetrator( s) who stole their money to the government agencies that 
failed to protect them. Bernie Madoff's victims, for example, have excoriated 
the SEC for its failure to detect Madoff's decades-long scheme. They have 
held rallies, importuned Congress, written blistering letters to the media, told 
their stories repeatedly on TV, and testified at Madoff's sentencing.76 
Wherever they gather, they always include the SEC as well as Madoff as an 
on the part of the paying agency; (3) a "low, fixed-percentage bount[y] with no nominal cap," generally in 
the range of one to three percent of the penalty recovered; and (4) an assurance of anonymity). 
74. For example, in Fiscal Year 2008, the Commission "returned more than $1 billion to harmed 
investors through Disgorgement and Fair Fund distributions." U.S. SEC. AND ExcH. CoMM'N, 2008 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 28, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/ 
secpar2008.pdf. The Commission recently established an Office of Collections and Distributions to further 
pursue the collection of funds for the benefit of investors. Stephen J. Crimmins, The SEC's Blueprint to 
Reinvigorate Enforcement, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 669,670 (Apr. 13, 2009). 
75. See generally Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 39,41 (2001) (describing the kinds of harms that typically befall fraud victims). 
76. In that proceeding, victims said things like "I am a victim because our government has failed 
me," ''The SEC's incompetence has let this psychopath steal from me," and"[ w]e have been devastated by 
the SEC's failure." Judge Denny Chin fmally had to admonish the victims to focus on the task at hand, the 
sentencing ofMadoff, and to stop trying to use the occasion to criticize the government. Jayne W. Barnard, 
Notes from Madoff's Sentencing (June 29, 2009) (unpublished, on file with author). 
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object of their scom.77 R. Allen Stanford's victims, too, sought relief from 
Congress by arguing, "[federal] agencies, along with Stanford, have robbed 
[us] of[our] American dream."78 
One way the SEC could help to restore its reputation as the protector of 
investors would be to create an in-house victim services unit. Employees of 
this unit would not serve as lawyers for victims, nor as psychotherapists. A 
victim services unit would, however, professionalize communications with 
victims, serve as a link between victims and lawyers within the Division, and 
ensure that victims are, and remain, informed about the progress of the 
enforcement proceeding. 
The SEC currently (and perhaps surprisingly) does not have a designated 
victim services unit. Occasionally, an Enforcement Division lawyer will work 
directly with one or more victims to gather facts or prepare their testimony for 
trial. Sometimes, in big cases, the Enforcement Division creates an 
informational web page. 79 More frequently, when a case is settled, a fund 
administrator is appointed to handle claims and disburse disgorgement 
proceeds to the victims. Fund administrators may set up a call center or 
establish a website to help victims with their claims. 
The SEC also has an Office of Investor Education and Advocacy that 
fields inquiries from investors, including those who have been defrauded. But, 
when the money has been lost, and in the absence of a criminal proceeding, 
victims of securities fraud are essentially left on their own. 80 In an odd case of 
legislative line drawing, victims of frauds whose victimizers are prosecuted 
criminally receive vastly more victim communication and support than do 
77. On the day ofMadoff's sentencing, many victims skipped the proceeding in order to attend a 
rally outside the courthouse where they inveighed against the SEC. They wore T-shirts that read, "SEC 
FAILED US." Zachery Kouwe, Waiting to See Madoff, an Angry Crowd is Disappointed, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 2009, at Bl. A group of Madoff's victims recently sued the SEC, alleging gross negligence in 
carrying out its enforcement responsibilities. Diana B. Henriques, Suit Claims S.E.C. Failed to Detect 
Madof!Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,2009, at Bll. 
78. Reuters, Agencies Were Told of Stanford Fraud, Investors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, 
atB6. 
79. See, e.g., SEC Case Against R. Allen Stanford (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2009/2009-26-update.htm. 
80. Some fraud victims now engage in self-help via the Internet. Madoffvictims, Stanford victims, 
and other victims' groups have created support sites and chat rooms to communicate with one another. See, 
e.g., Bernard MadoffFraud Victims Support Group Website, http://bernardmadoffvictims.org (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2009). While access to web-based communication provides an alternative to the isolation 
experienced by previous generations of victims, a centralized repository of victim information would help 
avoid duplication of effort and forcing victims to reinvent the wheel. 
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victims of otherwise identical frauds that are handled through the SEC's civil 
enforcement system. 81 
What might an SEC victim services unit do? The functions of 
prosecutorial victim assistance programs can give us some clues: 
( 1) contacting victims to alert them to the unfolding of an enforcement action; 
(2) explaining the process of civil enforcement and why a particular 
proceeding will be civil rather than criminal; (3) explaining the possible 
remedies available in a civil proceeding and soliciting victims' input; 
( 4) assisting victims in assembling and documenting their claims; ( 5) assisting 
victims in preparing affidavits, statements, or demonstrative evidence for 
testimony at trial; ( 6) communicating with victims about litigation 
developments, including settlement; (7) preparing victims for court 
proceedings; (8) accompanying victims to court proceedings; (9) referring 
victims for psychological support services (not providing direct delivery of 
services); ( 1 0) offering a clearinghouse of information (for example, about tax 
issues, pending legislation, and, where applicable, submissions to the SIPC); 
(11) helping to dispel "magical thinking" about the possibility of complete 
fmancial recovery; ( 12) providing follow-up communication with victims after 
an enforcement proceeding is concluded to make sure they understand their 
rights; and ( 13) debriefing victims who have information about the location of 
assets or possible post-settlement violations of injunctive orders or 
occupational bars. The keys to victim support are listening to victims' stories, 
keeping them apprised of developments in the case, and answering their 
questions about the legal process and their rights. 
Why should the SEC add victim services to its already-full plate? Critics 
could argue that providing victim services only protracts the victimhood 
experience and often fosters dependency. Others might argue that private 
lawyers, therapists, family members, and clergy are better situated than 
government employees to perform the tasks of victim support. Victim support 
can be labor intensive and requires empathy, patience, and mature judgment. 
It is therefore expensive and sometimes unwelcome. 
81. The Crime Victims Rights Act of2004 provides to "crime victims" the right to be present at 
public court proceedings involving the crime and the right to be "reasonably heard at any public proceeding 
in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding." 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 377I(a)(2}-{4) (2006). The statute also directs people in the Department of Justice to "make their best 
efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a)." 
§ 377I(c)(I). However, "[n]othing in the CVRA requires the Government to seek approval from crime 
victims before negotiating or entering into a settlement agreement." In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 
F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005). As a result of the CVRA, government-funded victim advocates are now very 
much a part of the federal prosecutorial system. 
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One can acknowledge the challenges and costs of victim support but still 
insist that victims of fraud--even those frauds that, for whatever reason, do not 
result in criminal prosecution-are victims and do suffer. They merit respect 
and support. The time has passed when we can assume that fraud victimization 
is merely a matter of being too gullible or too greedy; or that our response to 
victims should be governed by arcane jurisdictional distinctions between the 
Department of Justice (which is governed by the Crime Victims Rights Act 
and therefore provides victim support) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (which is not and therefore does not).82 As we discovered in the 
aftermath of the World Trade Center attack on 9/11, victims of crime often 
care much, much more about having someone listen to their stories than they 
care about fighting over available dollars.83 Within reason, the SEC should 
have a system in place to listen. 
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION SHOULD DEVELOP EXPERTISE ABOUT THE 
BIOGRAPHICAL, BEHAVIORAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
lNDMDUAL SECURITIES LAW VIOLATORS 
Much has been made in recent months of the SEC's inability to follow the 
trail of complex, derivatives-based trading schemes and other sophisticated 
sources of fraud on investors. What the Enforcement Division needs, 
according to critics, are keen mathematical minds trained in finance who can 
keep up with new products and financial engineering models.84 It also needs 
more people with technological expertise.85 Nobody disagrees. 
Let me, however, stake out a different claim here. At the same time the 
SEC expands its financial and technological expertise to detect complex 
fmancial schemes, it should also build a knowledge base about the kinds of 
defendants who engineer these schemes. There is much to be learned through 
82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
83. See KENNEllf R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORllf? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO 
CoMPENSATE 1lfE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 94 (2005) (recounting stories of claimants who refused to fill out the 
claim forms but wanted Feinberg to hear the stories of their lost loved ones). 
84. In response to this critique, the SEC created a new Fellows program to build capacity in the 
Office of Risk Assessment. Jesse Westbrook, SEC Offering Market Experts Salaries of More Than 
$200,000, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 30,2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid= 
aH4e Yn28mhrY &refer=home. The Office ofRiskAssessment has since been reorganized and renamed. See 
SEC Creates New Division, Taps Law Professor as First Director, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1723 
(Sept. 21, 2009). 
85. See Tom McGinty & Kara Scannell, SEC Plays Keep-Up in High-Tech Race, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 20, 2009, at Cl (noting that, "by many accounts, the [SEC] is outmatched by the traders and market 
venues with technology that is remaking the trading world."). 
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systematic study of the biographical backgrounds, behavioral quirks, and 
psychological profiles of securities law violators. The Enforcement Division 
should build behavioral expertise alongside the other forms of expertise it is 
currently seeking. It should create a small unit devoted to the application of 
forensic psychology to the task of securities law enforcement. 
What would the employees of a behavioral unit do? First, they would 
compile detailed information about the defendants in already-closed securities 
fraud cases. They might-and should-also conduct forensic assessments of 
securities law violators sitting in prison. The product of this process would be 
a rich tapestry of data that might reveal commonalities among these 
defendants. Reviewing that material in a systematic way might permit some 
reasonable prediction about which defendants are likely to recidivate or 
otherwise harm the investing public. 86 The process, in addition, might provide 
useful information about the circumstances in which the SEC's civil 
sanctions-cease-and-desist orders, obey-the-law injunctions, penny stock 
bars, and officer-and-director bars-are likely to fail. 
Second, the behavioral unit would work with investigators and lawyers in 
current cases, bringing psychological expertise to the table. People in the 
behavioral unit could ( 1) assist investigators in conducting background checks 
and behavioral analyses of targets of investigation; (2) help identify which 
targets of investigation present a recidivism profile;87 (3) help identify those 
defendants who should be referred for criminal prosecution; ( 4) help identify 
those defendants who need not be prosecuted criminally but are nevertheless 
deserving of forward-looking civil sanctions; (5) assist in designing 
meaningful remedial provisions for injunctions and occupational bars for those 
defendants deserving offorward-looking civil sanctions; ( 6) assist in designing 
a program for monitoring defendants who have settled their cases but present 
a high risk of continued violations;88 and (7) track future encounters with law 
enforcement agencies of defendants after they have left the SEC system. 
Employees of the behavioral unit could also consult on organizational 
behavioral issues when the defendant is a business enterprise. 89 
86. There is, of course, a rich history of such projects. For example, states for nearly a century have 
maintained and analyzed data on the characteristics of imprisoned offenders, in order to make informed 
parole decisions. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, PREDICTING, AND 
POLICING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 47-76 (2007) (detailing the history of these projects). Most of these 
projects have involved violent offenders. 
87. See infra Part V.A. 
88. See infra Part V.B. 
89. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 793, 832 [hereinafter Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics] (noting that a 
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Most importantly, employees of the behavioral unit could provide a 
source of institutional memory and expertise about which sanctions are 
effective in deterring future misconduct and which are merely cosmetic. By 
gathering information, tracking it over time, and reaching informed 
conclusions about what works and what does not in a variety of contexts, the 
behavioral unit would help the SEC become a "learning organization."90 
A. Gathering Information About Ponzi Schemers 
Let me be more specific about the kinds of information the behavioral unit 
would gather. First, such a unit might consider the psychological makeup and 
biographical milestones of audacious Ponzi schemers like Bernie Madoff, R. 
Allen Stanford,91 Tom Petters,92 and Arthur Nadel.93 It might also look at some 
of the less notorious (but equally dangerous) schemers like Bruce Friedman,94 
Clelia Flores,95 and Peter Son.96 
All of these defendants are alleged to have constructed elaborate 
deceptions, skimmed money off the top to enrich themselves (often wrapping 
themselves in cocoons of luxury), used some of the funds to enrich their 
reputation in the community through conspicuous charitable giving, and were 
able to establish trust and confidence among thousands of customers, clients, 
and friends. Why and how did they do it? It isn't enough to say they were 
sophisticated understanding of group dynamics is required to achieve meaningful organizational change). 
90. There are many defmitions of" learning organization." Generally, though, a learning organization 
is one that "facilitates the learning of its members and continuously transforms itself' to more effectively 
achieve its goals, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki!Leaming_organization (last visited Nov. II, 2009). 
91. See Julie Creswell eta!., Fraud Parade: $8 Billion Case is Next in Line, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2009, at A I (describing the Texas Ponzi schemer who sought a knighthood in Antigua, lived in the spotlight 
of sports and charity events, and misrepresented the safety and security ofhigh-yield certificates of deposit 
sold by his eponymous bank). 
92. See Paul Tharp, Buffett Wannabe Tied to $2B Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. POST, Oct. 2, 2008, at 61 
(describing the Minneapolis Ponzi schemer who fancied himself a business genius, "hobnobbed with 
billionaires and movie stars[,]" and defrauded several major hedge funds of hundreds of millions of dollars). 
93. See Leslie Wayne, The Mini-Madoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,2009,atBI (describing the prominent 
Florida money manager who faked his suicide to avoid arrest after being charged with a $300 million 
investment fraud). 
94. Stuart Pfeifer, Manager Yields Control of Firms, L.A. TIMES, Mar. II, 2009, at B2 (detailing 
charges against a California man accused of diverting $17 million of investors' money to his personal use 
twenty-seven years after he had been convicted and sentenced to prison for grand theft). 
95. Stuart Pfeifer, Alleged Scam Targeted Latinos, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14,2009, at B2 (describing an 
alleged scheme that netted $23 million). 
96. Henry K. Lee, 2 Bay Area Men Sued by SEC-Investment Scam Targeted Koreans, S.F. CHRON., 
June 10,2009, at C4 (describing an alleged scheme that netted $80 million). 
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greedy or evil or uncommonly-skilled liars. A forensic review of these 
offenders' backgrounds and behaviors might tell us much more. 
It is obvious, for example, that Bernie Madoff had some kind of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder.97 Did that condition drive his fraud, facilitate 
its execution, assist him in avoiding detection, or is it irrelevant in detecting 
and deterring Ponzi schemers? R. Allen Stanford had delusions of grandeur.98 
Did his over-the-top sense of self cause him to believe that his Ponzi scheme 
could go on forever? What did he believe? And what behavioral patterns, if 
any, are common to other Ponzi schemers? 
Here are some possibilities. Many Ponzi schemers have a history of 
problem gambling.99 Some of them have a history ofbetrayal and wrongdoing 
in fields other than securities sales. 100 Many of them have long histories of 
small-time shady dealings. 101 Some of them are involved in real estate102 or the 
97. See ERIN ARVEDLUND, TOO Gooo TO BE TRUE: THE RISE AND FALL OF BERNIE MAooFF 61 
(2009) (describing Madoff's insistence on paperless desks, furniture placement at precise right angles, 
window blinds and computer screens all aligned at the same level, perfectly-hung picture frames, and the 
use ofblack-not blue-ink); ANDREW KIRTZMAN, BETRAYAL: THE LIFE AND LIES OF BERNIE MAooFF 60, 
117-18 (2009) (noting that, at home, Madoff insisted on perfectly-trimmed hedges; he also "was forever 
straightening rugs, drapes, objects on his tables." At the office, "he'd get down on his hands and knees in 
the reception area to straighten out the Persian rug leading to the elevator. A staffer once found him 
vacuuming his floor at 7:30 in the morning."). 
98. See Bryan Burroughs, Pirate of the Caribbean, VANITY FAIR, June 3, 2009, at 76 (noting that 
Stanford lived in a mansion with a moat, gave "millions to hospitals, theaters, and museums," created the 
Stanford Cup for international cricket matches, and offered a $20 million prize for the winner). 
99. See, e.g., Tom Gilroy, Ponzi Scheme Operator Who Targeted Family Members Pleads Guilty, 
41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1625 (Aug. 31, 2009) (noting that defendant who had operated a Ponzi 
scheme had lost some $5.2 million in clandestine poker games held regularly in a suite at a luxury Beverly 
Hills hotel); Francis X. Donnelly, Billionaire Boys Club: Execs Accused in $53 Million Ponzi Scheme, THE 
DETROIT NEWS, July 29,2009, at AI (noting that alleged Ponzi schemers used some of their proceeds to pay 
gambling debts); Martin Zimmerman, Irvine CEO Hit With Fraud Claims, L.A. nMEs, Apr. 28, 2009, at B2 
(noting allegations that alleged Ponzi schemer was a "high-stakes gambler" with ties to Taiwanese organized 
crime); Charlie Gasparino, Accused Swindler Cosmo Owed Thousands to the Mob, CNBC.COM, Jan. 27, 
2009, http://www.cnbc.com/id/28878404 (noting that alleged Ponzi schemer had once owed tens of 
thousands of dollars in gambling debts to the Genovese crime family). 
I 00. See, e.g., Tina Moore, Checks Out After $350M Vanishes, Fla. Cops Hunt Another Hedge Fund 
Scoundrel, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18,2009, at 18 (noting that alleged Ponzi schemer Arthur Nadel had 
previously been disbarred for misusing escrow funds); SEC v. YES Entertainment LLC, SEC Litigation 
Release 16786 (Oct. 31, 2000) (noting that Ponzi schemer had been disbarred for misappropriation of client 
funds); Daniel J. Lehmann, Ex-Talent Agent Faces SEC Suit in Investing Scam, CHI. SUN-nMEs, Jan. 5, 
1995, at 18 (noting that alleged Ponzi schemer was a disbarred lawyer). 
I 0 I. See, e.g., Michael Beebe, Ponzi Suspect Piccoli Had Earlier Run-In, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 16, 
2009, at B I (noting that man charged with Ponzi scheme targeted at Catholics and Catholic priests [be has 
since pleaded guilty] had, in the 1970s, been accused of orchestrating a scheme in which he violated the 
usury laws in the sale of a home to an elderly woman). 
102. See, e.g., SEC v. Global Asset Partners LLC, SEC Litigation Release 20220 (Aug. I, 2009) 
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sex trade. 103 Most of them are over 40, married, and own their own homes.104 
Very few of them are women. 105 
Do any of these facts (or others) have meaning in identifying, thwarting, 
or sanctioning Ponzi schemers? Other than through institutional folklore, I'm 
guessing the SEC does not know. 
B. Gathering Information About Defendants Who Engage in Organizational 
Fraud 
Behavioral assessment would not just apply to Ponzi schemers. A 
behavioral unit could also assess the high-level corporate leaders who lead 
their companies into financial ruin. Conrad Black, Phillip Bennett, and Bernie 
Ebbers come to mind. 106 What might we learn by studying these defendants? 
Even from a distance, there seem to be observable patterns of behavior among 
the corporate leaders who oversee and facilitate major financial reporting 
frauds. These executives are generally domineering, narcissistic, charismatic, 
and grandiose. 107 To reinforce their inflated self-images, they create fictitious 
transactions, fictitious profits, and ultimately fictitious business empires. This 
scenario often repeats itself: A CEO with a strong sense ofhis own superiority 
sometimes cannot face the financial realities of his business, and thus initiates 
ever-growing accounting adjustments to hide the failure of his vision. 108 He 
often enlists subordinates who are reluctant to say no, or are eager to be of 
help. 
Thus, the SEC should learn more as well about the chief financial officers 
who begin with small accounting "fiddles," then escalate their fraud until it 
(noting that defendant charged with orchestrating a $5 million Ponzi scheme diverted investor funds to a 
now-bankrupt Texas real estate project). 
I 03. See, e.g., Chad Bray, SEC Charges Brooklyn Money Manager With Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 
2009, at A6 (noting that defendant charged with operating a $40 million Ponzi scheme used some of the 
investors' funds to fmance his pornography business). 
I 04. DAVID WEISBURD, ELIN WARING & ELLEN F. CHA YET, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND CRIMINAL 
CAREERS 25 tbl.l.l (2001). 
105. Id In this study, 99.4% of the securities law violators were white men. 
I 06. Black, Bennett, and Ebbers are respectively serving six-and-a-half, sixteen, and twenty-five years 
in prison. 
I 07. See generally Jayne W. Barnard, Narcissism, Over-Optimism, Fear, Anger, and Depression: The 
Interior Lives of Corporate Leaders, 11 U. CIN. L. REv. 405 (2009) (tracing the characteristics of many 
failed CEOs, including Ken Lay, Bernie Ebbers, and Conrad Black). These characteristics, of course, are 
not limited to felonious CEOs. They may also characterize legendarily successful CEOs. See id. (describing 
Jack Welch). 
108. Id at 420-21. 
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becomes uncontrollable. Sometimes, they claim, they are merely trying to meet 
the company's earnings estimates, which they think of as a harmless and 
temporary exercise. 109 Often they are engaged in some form of rescue fantasy 
and believe, in the face of contrary evidence, that they can somehow "with just 
a little more time" make things right. 110 Sometimes, they are working to protect 
their own equity stakes and-driven to stay at the top of the pay scale 
pyramid-become blinded to their crimes. Are these CFOs fantasists? Simply 
optimists? Have they always been rule breakers or do circumstances and stress 
reset their ethical thermostats? Do their employment histories or details in their 
employment files tell us anything we ought to know? 
The SEC should also learn more about the middle management defendants 
who get swept up in the others' misconduct, and, for reasons ofloyalty, fear, 
or some perverted sense of adventure, become active participants in 
organizational fraud. Administrative assistants, bookkeepers, tax accountants, 
and even in-house counsel have ended up in prison for joining a criminal team. 
What do these people have in common? Are they meek and servile and unable 
to resist recruitment? Or are they ambitious and outgoing, and think of 
themselves as born leaders? Do they pride themselves on being problem 
solvers? Are they acting simply out of economic need? 
C. Gathering Information About Other Securities Fraud Offenders 
There are other categories of offenders, as well. Brokers who steal from 
their customers; 111 brokers who defraud their customers by misrepresenting the 
risks of the products they are selling; 112 pump-and-dump artists who find their 
victims on the Internet; 113 and insider traders who are confident that their 
109. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Enron Figures Tell How Results Were Manipulated, N.Y. TiMES, 
Feb. 28,2006, at C3 (describing the testimony of Wesley H. Colwell, Enron's Chief Accounting Officer, 
that he sometimes "dipped into reserve accounts" in order to "beat analysts' estimates"). 
110. See Former CEO Indicted in WorldCom Scandal, SEATILE TiMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at El 
(recounting the story of Scott Sullivan, WorldCom's CFO: "[I manipulated financial statements] in a 
misguided effort to preserve the company to allow it to withstand what I believed were temporary fmancial 
difficulties."). 
111. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002)(tracing story of broker who stole from his disabled 
clients). 
112. See Bloomberg News, Former Broker at Credit Suisse Found Guilty, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 18,2009, 
at 82 (describing defendant's sales of products he falsely described as "backed by federally-guaranteed 
student loans and a safe alternative to bank deposits. The products were actually linked to auction-rate 
securities."). 
113. See SEC v. C. Jones & Co., SEC Litigation Release 20940(Mar. 10, 2009)(noting that defendant 
posted "baseless projections and other fmancial information" without disclosing he was being compensated 
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trades can never be traced. 114 Are these people bullies? Micromanagers? Are 
they conspicuously religious? Openly hedonistic? Do they need uppers (or 
downers) to get through the day? 
By employing behavioral experts who could systematically study the 
personality traits and behavioral characteristics of these securities law 
violators, the Enforcement Division could more effectively target the firms and 
individuals who deserve investigation, especially in the face of tens of 
thousands of tips every year. 115 Applying the insights of the behavioral unit, 
the Enforcement Division could deploy its investigational resources toward the 
types of people who are likely to generate the most harm. 
The point of the behavioral unit, by the way, is not to develop the kind of 
"profile" by which behavioral generalizations would frame SEC 
investigations. I certainly do not have in mind the SEC saying "round up all 
the bald-headed 40-year-old former used-car salesmen who currently smoke 
cigars, engage in the sale of penny stocks, and also have a drinking problem." 
Rather, the point is to identify commonalities among defendants-if such 
exist-and to use that knowledge strategically on a case-by-case basis. 
Decisions about sanctions based on real data and not merely on gut feelings 
can only enhance the task of securities law enforcement. We are not talking 
about fleets of people here. With hundreds of cases each year in the 
Enforcement Division, 116 a team of fewer than a dozen people-forensic 
psychologists and criminologists, together with support personnel-could 
probably handle the work. 
The obvious objections to this proposal are the cost and institutional 
disruption involved in creating a new operating unit; the inevitable clash of 
wills between lawyers and non-lawyers in what has traditionally been a 
lawyer-centric agency; the inadequacy of the available population of offenders 
to give rise to any meaningful statistical data (defendants who have gone 
through the SEC enforcement system number in the thousands rather than the 
tens ofthousands---Qr more---Qffenders typically involved in predictive data-
gathering); the likelihood that retrospective reviews of information about 
defendants will prove unfruitful because nobody asked the defendants (or 
others with knowledge) the right questions; notwithstanding these criticisms, 
by the company and was, at the time of the posting, selling the company's stock). 
114. See SEC v. Accord, SEC Litigation Release 21132 (July 15, 2009) (describing insider trading 
violations by a lawyer and an accountant, as well as in-laws and friends, who acquired shares of a company 
shortly before it issued an announcement that it was to be acquired). 
115. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
116. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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the likelihood of excessive reliance on actuarial, rather than clinical, 
assessments of targets of investigations and defendants; 117 and the notion that 
behavioral tracking, as opposed to fugitive tracking or asset tracking, is a law 
enforcement luxury. 118 
One might respond to these objections by organizing the behavioral unit 
as a pilot project, and authorizing it subject to a sunset provision to test 
whether the unit has been effective in assisting existing Enforcement Division 
personnel. A better response is to imagine that the addition of behavioral 
experts to the lawyer-investigator teams that now define and pursue securities 
fraud wrongdoers might just enrich the agency's performance. Just as 
anthropologists have brought a new skill set into the corporate world, 119 and 
other social scientists have influenced military strategies, 120 behavioral 
scientists could bring new perspectives to the prioritization and practice of 
securities law enforcement. 
V. THE ENFORCEMENT DIVISION SHOULD IDENTIFY LIKELY RECIDIVISTS AT 
THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE STAGE AND CREATE A MONITORING PROGRAM FOR 
SECURITIES LAW VIOLATORS WHO PRESENT A RECIDIVISM PROFILE 
Whether or not the Enforcement Division systematically assesses all the 
defendants with whom it deals, it should develop a sense of what drives and 
distinguishes a securities fraud recidivist. Recidivism may have many sources: 
simple greed; technocratic competence unencumbered by a sense of right and 
wrong; uncontrollable compulsion; outright criminality with a desire to do 
harm; and some combination of one or more of these traits. 121 
117. When the sample size is sufficient, ''preponderant evidence shows that statistical techniques of 
risk assessment are clearly superior to clinical assessments." BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., OFFENDER RisK 
ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE STAGE EVALUATION 28 (2002), http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/ 
risk_ off_ rpt.pdf ("[S]tudies show that statistical methods outperform both mental health professionals and 
correctional caseworkers in predicting recidivism."). 
118. Skeptics might also suggest that behavioral profiling, however scientifically-based, is just a 
modem version of the practice of phrenology. 
119. See Posting of Tom Davenport to Harvard Business Review Blog, The Rise of Corporate 
Anthropology, http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/davenport/2007 /11/the _rise_ of_ corporate_ anthropo.html 
(Nov. 28, 2007, 9:01 EST). Corporate anthropologists use their observational and interviewing skills to 
study consumer behavior and workflow issues, examine corporate cultures, and help build communities 
within organizations. /d 
120. VanessaM. Gezari, RoughTe"ain, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,2009, (Magazine), at Wl6 (describing 
the use of embedded anthropologists and psychologists who are assisting front-line soldiers in Afghanistan). 
121. Seegeneral/yNEALSHOVER&ANDYHOCHSTE1LER,CHOOSINGWHITE-COLLARCRIME(2006). 
Julian Roberts has recognized "there may be many reasons for [recidivism], including defiance, weak will, 
force of circumstances, or even physiological causes (the offender may have an addiction that is responsible 
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Recidivism surfaces regularly at the SEC. 122 Many offenders, particularly 
Ponzi scheme offenders, have long track records of similar fraud schemes. 123 
They often also have related histories of misappropriation, fraud, or 
professional misconduct. 124 The Enforcement Division does not seem to know 
what to do with these people. So, time after time, we see defendants cycling 
and recycling through the SEC civil enforcement system. Some defendants 
have been enjoined by the SEC three, four, five, or even six times. 125 
A. Conducting a Risk Assessment 
It is fair to ask how the SEC is supposed to know when it's got a likely 
recidivist on its hands. When there is a history of documented and similar 
misconduct in the defendant's record, it's easy. 126 When a defendant appears 
as a first offender, however, it can be much more difficult. Predictions are 
inevitably imperfect. Still, there are some markers of likely recidivism, even 
for first offenders, and the Enforcement Division should become more familiar 
with those markers. 
I have argued elsewhere, for example, that many con artists and Ponzi 
schemers suffer from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), the technical 
term for what is often referred to as "psychopathy." This condition is 
characterized by lifelong habits oflying, conning, cheating, and stealing. Most 
experts agree the condition is untreatable and that persons who suffer from 
for his offending) . . .. "). JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING COMMUNITY 
AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 62 (2008) [hereinafter ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS]. 
Y oungjae Lee has offered a similar catalog of traits that may account for recidivism: [The possibilities 
include] cruelty, malice, abusiveness, arrogance (manifesting in the belief that rules of the society do not 
apply to them, callousness, dishonesty (if the crimes involve fraud), greed, hatred (if the crimes are 
motivated by hateful feelings), indifference (to human suffering), lack of discipline (if the crimes result from 
an inability to stick to a law-abiding path), weakness of will (if the crimes results from an inability to resist 
temptations), insensitivity, irresponsibility, or ruthlessness. Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A 
Relational Account, 87 TEX. L. REv. 571,586 (2009). 
122. See generally Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism and Dete"ence, 1 13 PENN. ST. 
L. REv. 189 (2008) [hereinafter Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, Dete"ence] (examining the careers 
of several recidivist securities fraud offenders). 
123. See id 
124. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
125. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, Dete"ence, supra note 122 (setting out numerous 
examples of multiple sequential injunctions). 
126. In a study of offenders prosecuted criminally, "serial offenders [were] more than 500% more 
likely to recidivate . .. than non-serial offenders [were]." Larry Laudan, Taking the Ratio of Differences 
Seriously: The Multiple Offender and the Standard of Proof. or, Different Strokes for Serial Folks 5 (July 8, 
2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1431616. 
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APD are unlikely-indeed, unable-to reform. 127 These people are devoid of 
conscience and incapable of remorse even when they have grievously damaged 
others. They do not respond to imprisonment or threats of imprisonment, let 
alone something as diaphanous as an obey-the-law injunction or a cease-and-
desist order. 128 Financial penalties also do not deter them. 
It is often difficult to imagine these people as true predators. They are 
typically smart, charming, raffish, witty, and glib. 129 Little wonder, then, that 
victims find these schemers and their stories so appealing. It is harder to 
understand why the Enforcement Division seems to fall into the same trap. 
My theory is that most of the recidivists who come before the 
SEC-perhaps all of them-could have been identified as likely recidivists 
early or earlier in their careers. Even when they are before the SEC for the first 
time, these defendants could be identified as likely recidivists if the 
Enforcement Division had a behavioral unit (or trained individuals) with an 
understanding of personality disorders. 
My prescription here is that the Enforcement Division should recognize 
the existence of APD and consider the likelihood that many individuals who 
come before it suffer from this chronic disorder. 130 The Division should treat 
defendants with a pattern of lying and scamming as special targets. It should 
( 1) work to identify at an early stage those defendants who, based on their 
business and social history, appear constitutionally unable to confine their 
behavior to social or legal norms; (2) divert those defendants to investigators 
and attorneys with behavioral expertise (a Recidivism TaskForce); 131 (3) refer 
many of these defendants for criminal prosecution rather than relying on civil 
enforcement; (4) refer any of these defendants who have previously been 
sanctioned by the SEC, for criminal prosecution;132 (5) within the civil 
enforcement context, use its knowledge of defendants' behavioral profiles to 
build the case for injunctive relief and occupational bars; and (6) design very 
127. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, Deterrence, supra note 122. 
128. /d. 
129. See John Seabrook, Suffering Souls: The search for the roots of psychopathy, NEW YORKER, 
Nov. 10, 2008, at 64, 67 (describing psychopaths as "charming and intelligent." The "psychopath talks 
'entertainingly,' [psychiatrist Hervey] Cleckley explain[ s ], and is 'brilliant and charming,' but nonetheless 
'carries disaster lightly in each hand."'). 
130. Three percent of the U.S. male population is said to suffer from some form of APD. Surely, the 
percentage of SEC defendants who have a history of scamming and conning is significantly higher than that. 
131. See Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, Deterrence, supra note 122, at 224 (recommending 
the creation of a Securities Fraud Recidivism Task Force within the Enforcement Division). 
132. This "no second chance" rule is further discussed in Part VI, infra. 
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specific remedial provisions to minimize the likelihood of recidivism and 
maximize the chance that defendants who do recidivate are quickly detected. 
Targeting likely recidivists for special treatment and heightened scrutiny 
is, of course, not a new idea. The federal Sentencing Guidelines already 
recognize that a defendant with a criminal history is deserving of harsher 
treatment than a first-time offender. 133 And almost every punishment theory 
shares the view that prior offenses are relevant to decisions about current 
punishment. 134 The same should hold true in civil enforcement proceedings. 
B. Post-Sanction Monitoring 
The SEC should do more than just catalog personality traits and diagnose 
defendants' personality disorders in order to identify likely recidivists. It 
should use what it knows. Importantly, it should do more than treat likely 
recidivists as if they intend to reform and become good citizens and then (as 
often currently occurs) send them on their way with an obey-the-law 
injunction. 135 The vast majority of the SEC's civil enforcement actions result 
in settlement. Thus, in any case in which an individual defendant presents a 
recidivism profile and is not referred for criminal prosecution, the Enforcement 
Division should insist as a condition of settlement on consent to post-sanction 
monitoring. This monitoring might include unscheduled office and home 
visits; access to phone records, bank records and state and federal income tax 
returns; employment verification; periodic interviews with family members, 
neighbors and co-workers; physical surveillance and computer surveillance; 
and submission of periodic self-reports by the defendant. The decision to 
accept such monitoring would be voluntary in the sense that a defendant 
wishing to avoid it would be welcome to go to trial and convince the judge that 
he or she is innocent or undeserving of a monitoring regime. Alternatively, the 
defendant may want to negotiate the specifics of the monitoring 
provision-lawyers negotiate the fine points ofSEC settlements every day. 136 
The obvious objections to this proposal are the cost of monitoring; the risk 
of over- or under-inclusiveness (false positives and false negatives) in 
133. See 2008 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL CHAPTER 4, http://www.ussc.gov/ 
2008guid/GL2008.pdf("Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood"). 
134. See ROBERTS, PuNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS, supra note 121, at 90-92 (summarizing 
seventeen theories of sentencing and the role that recidivist sentencing premiums or frrst-offenderdiscounts 
plays in each). 
135. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
136. See Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics, supra note 89, at 816-20 (describing some of the 
dynamics of settlements with the SEC). 
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identifying those defendants who should be subject to a monitoring regime; 
privacy issues; the risk of"branding" a first-offender as a recidivism risk, thus 
enhancing the likelihood of recidivism rather than reducing it; usurpation of 
authority from the criminal justice system (SEC monitoring would, after all, 
replicate much of what the FBI is supposed to do); and a general sense that 
government monitoring, even of people who have defrauded their neighbors, 
is somehow on-American. One shouldn't have to forfeit his privacy rights in 
the absence of a criminal prosecution. 
A monitoring regime, however, offers several advantages over the current 
practice of privileging hope (in the form of an obey-the-law injunction) over 
experience (the many cases in which fraud defendants recidivate): Awareness 
of the SEC's ongoing interest in one's activities is surely a more effective 
deterrent than believing (probably correctly) that the SEC has moved on to 
other matters; regular monitoring offers the possibility of early or earlier 
intervention in the form of an asset freeze or contempt of court proceeding, in 
the event the defendant recidivates; monitoring accompanied by quick action 
is likely to be less costly than having to initiate an entirely new enforcement 
proceeding "from scratch." It is certainly more attractive to defendants (and 
less costly to the public) than the alternative of a criminal prosecution. 
VI. THE SEC SHOULD ARTICULATE A SANCTION POLICY FOR INDIVIDUAL 
DEFENDANTS THAT IS PROPORTIONATE, PROGRESSIVE, REMEDIAL, 
AND REAL 
Let us assume that the monitoring proposal is not adopted-too expensive, 
too exotic, perhaps unconstitutional. The SEC Enforcement Division 
nevertheless should take steps to articulate a coherent sanction policy for 
securities law violators rather than continuing to employ the current "grab 
bag" approach to imposing civil remedies. 
Over the years, the SEC has successfully importuned Congress to provide 
it with a rich assortment of remedial enforcement tools--disgorgement orders, 
cease-and-desist orders, injunctions, civil penalties, penny stock bars, and 
occupational bars. The SEC also has statutory authority to seek "any equitable 
relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors."m 
There is little, in short, that the SEC cannot seek as a remedy for securities law 
violations. The obvious limit is imprisonment-only the Department of Justice 
can seek that punishment. 
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d)(S) (2006). 
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Some observers have argued that the SEC, too, should be able to seek 
criminal penalties, 138 but that is not the point that I want to make here. Rather, 
recognizing that the SEC is a civil regulatory agency, and accepting that, as 
such, it should be confined to seeking civil remedies, I submit that the SEC can 
and should be more rational in its deployment of remedial tools. Specifically, 
it should articulate, and then adhere to, a sanction policy that (1) aligns 
sanctions with culpability and harm; (2) escalates sanctions for repeat 
offenders; (3) minimizes, through intelligent remedial techniques, the 
likelihood of repeated misconduct; and ( 4) doesn't waste the agency's time on 
pointless or cosmetic sanctions. 
How might such a sanction policy work? Some securities law violators, 
it is fair to say, are "situational" wrongdoers-decent, "conventional people" 
who get caught up in criminal situations. 139 Others are simply bad people who 
would, in a different environment or with different educational credentials, be 
just as likely to use a gun and burglarize your home. SEC sanctioning policy 
should treat these offenders differently. 
Thinking about these two models of offenders, we recognize that these 
descriptions are consistent with two general theories of human behavior-the 
"dispositionist" theory and the "situationist" theory. 140 A dispositionist 
believes, for example, that Jones has filed for bankruptcy because he is lazy 
and lacks self-discipline. A situationist believes that Jones has filed for 
bankruptcy because, after a medical crisis in his family and, no matter how 
hard he worked, he couldn't keep up with the family's bills. 
Most modem observers agree that neither the dispositionist theory nor the 
situationist theory adequately captures the process by which most people take 
action or make decisions about how to behave. A middle ground, known as the 
"interactionist" theory, better captures the way most people operate. Decisions 
138. See Zachary A. Goldfarb, The SEC's New Enforcer: Former U.S. Prosecutor Charged With 
Adding Muscle, Restoring Agency's Image, WASH. PosT, Apr. 7, 2009, at Al6 (noting that, in a recent 
speech SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar had said "the agency needs Congress to give it new legal powers. 
'The commission needs authority to bring criminal charges where the Department of Justice has declined 
to do so,' he said."). 
139. David Weisburd, Elin Waring & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Getting Beyond the Moral Drama of 
Crime: What We Learn From Studying White-Collar Criminal Careers, in CORPORA TEAND WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIME (John Minkes & Leonard Minkes eds., 2008). 
140. See generally Adam Benforado & Jon Hansen, The Great Attributional Divide: How Legal 
Policy Debates Are Shaped by Divergent Views of Human Nature, 57 EMORY L.J. 311 (2008) (describing 
generally the "situationist" and "dispositionist" views of human behavior). 
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about behavior (including unconscious decisions) are generally a product of 
the interaction between disposition and situation. 141 
Criminologists use a more specific approach to white-collar crime, noting 
that financial wrongdoers typically exist on a continuum running from "crisis 
responders" to "opportunity takers" to "opportunity seekers" to "chronic 
offenders."142 Crisis responders are the least culpable for their crimes; chronic 
offenders deserve (and generally receive) far greater punishment. 
By introducing the psychologists to the criminologists and putting their 
concepts together, we can imagine a fraud culpability continuum that looks 
something like this: 
Situationist I Dispositionist 
Interactionist 
Crisis Responder I Opportunity Taker I Opportunity Seeker I Chronic Offender 
Now, let us assume we have a group of securities law violators, all of 
whom have acted with the requisite scienter and all of whom have caused 
demonstrable harm. A rational sanctioning policy would reflect the notion that 
the "dessert" of their wrongdoing should be tied, at least in part, to the 
defendants' position on the culpability continuum. 
How might this work? First, the Enforcement Division (preferably, with 
the help of its behavioral unitY43 would situate these defendants somewhere 
along the continuum. Those who reside at the "chronic offender" end of the 
scale would be referred to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution. 144 
There is no point in trying to sanction these offenders with civil sanctions. 
And, to be clear, where there is clear and convincing evidence that the 
offender is a "chronic offender" on the basis of prior interactions with the SEC 
141. See Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Reshaping the "Grotesque'' Doctrine of Character Evidence: The 
Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 Sw. U. L. REv. 741, 753-54 (2008). 
142. WEISBURD, WARING & CHA YET, supra note I 04. A "crisis responder'' is someone who responds 
to a personal or professional crisis by resorting to crime. /d. at 59. An "opportunity taker" commits a crime 
because a sudden or unusual opportunity arises that is too good to pass up. /d. at 64. An "opportunity 
seeker" spends considerable time imagining and engineering a role in fraudulent schemes. Jd at 78. A 
"chronic offender" is a person who has a demonstrated record of recidivism. See id at 53, 74. 
143. See supra Part IV. 
144. Of course, other violators may also be referred for criminal prosecution, even though there is no 
evidence that they are or are likely to be chronic offenders. For example, high-profile mega-violators like 
Jeffrey Skilling and Bernie Ebbers were appropriately diverted to the criminal justice system. Ditto the 
colleagues who aided and abetted them. 
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or other law enforcement agencies, there should be no second chance for civil 
enforcement. Chronic offenders should be criminally prosecuted. The SEC 
should end the practice of seeking sequential injunctions for members of this 
group.'4s 
Offenders at the "crisis responder" end of the scale, on the other hand, 
should generally be subject only to disgorgement of profits and (perhaps) to 
entry of a cease-and-desist order. They may also be candidates for a civil 
penalty. 146 They will only rarely be suitable candidates for imposition of an 
injunction or any kind of occupational bar. 147 Monitoring is unnecessary for 
this population. Crisis responders, in short, are not scoundrels and pose little 
threat to the investment markets. Heaping unnecessary sanctions on these 
offenders-assuming they are correctly categorized-is a waste of law 
enforcement resources and undermines respect for the SEC. 
The most interesting defendants, of course, are the ones in the middle of 
the spectrum between the chronic offenders and the crisis responders. The 
opportunity takers present, for me, the most interesting challenge. Opportunity 
takers do not set out to engage in fraud, but are willing to do so if the 
circumstances seem sufficiently inviting. Their level of scienter is, by 
definition, higher than that of a crisis responder but lower than that of an 
opportunity seeker. And, unlike opportunity seekers, the risk of recidivism for 
an opportunity taker is low. Thus, opportunity takers should rarely be 
145. There will, of course, be exceptions to the "no second chance" rule, where the evidence may not 
support a criminal conviction but can support a civil judgment. But those exceptions should be rare. Chronic 
offenders are dangerous predators and should be dealt with in the criminal justice system. The preference 
of some U.S. attorneys to reject these cases as ''too small to prosecute" is bad public policy and should be 
addressed at a higher level within the Justice Department. 
146. First-tier penalties are available for defendants who violate any provision of the federal securities 
laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78u( d)(3)(B)(i) (2006). The maximum first-tier penalty for a natural person is the greater 
of $5,000 or the amount of his pecuniary gain from the violation. Second-tier penalties are available for 
defendants who violate any provision of the federal securities laws in a manner that involved fraud, deceit, 
manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii) 
(2006). The maximum second-tier penalty for a natural person is the greater of$50,000 or the amount of his 
pecuniary gain from the fraud. 
Third-tier civil penalties are available for the same defendants as those who are eligible for a second-
tier penalty, but third-tier penalties are imposed in cases of frauds that "directly or indirectly result ... in 
substantial losses or create a significant risk of substantial losses to other persons." 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (2006). The maximum third-tier penalty for a natural person is the greater of$100,000 
or the amount of his pecuniary gain from the fraud. 
147. See Jayne W. Barnard, Rule JOb-5 and the "Unfitness" Question, 47 ARiz. L.REv. 9, 54(2005) 
(arguing that situational offenders should rarely be subject to an officer-or-director bar). 
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candidates for an injunction or an occupational bar. They may be candidates 
for a civil penalty. 148 Monitoring should be a low priority for this population. 
Opportunity seekers ratchet up the sanctioning stakes. In the jargon of the 
entrapment defense, opportunity seekers are people with a predisposition to 
crime. 149 They are natural candidates for imposition of injunctions and, often, 
for occupational bars. They may also be candidates for a civil penalty. 150 This 
is a population for whom monitoring may be appropriate. 
Categorizing offenders systematically more or less along these lines will 
lead to more coherent, proportional sanctions for securities law violators. It 
will also permit an escalation of sanctions for those who present a risk of 
future harm. It will put monitoring resources where they are most needed. And, 
finally, it will ensure that the truly predatory securities law violators-the 
chronic offenders-are sanctioned appropriately by the criminal justice 
system, not treated ineffectively with civil sanctions that they can (and often 
do) ignore. 
There is one last factor in any rational sanctioning policy. Where 
defendants have been diverted for criminal prosecution and have pleaded or 
been found guilty, the SEC should generally leave them alone. Often, the 
Enforcement Division lags behind the Justice Department and, after a 
defendant has gone off to prison, pursues some unnecessary sanction like an 
officer-and-director bar, 151 an occupational bar, 152 or an injunction. 153 This kind 
of piling on is wasteful and unwise. 154 If, as Robert Khuzami has said, the goal 
of Enforcement is to use its resources "strategically" and achieve meaningful 
results, 155 then pursuing civil sanctions against a defendant who is languishing 
in prison makes little sense. 156 And keeping cases open rather than quickly 
148. See supra note 146. 
149. See PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE§ 2.03B (2009). 
150. See supra note 146. 
151. See, e.g., SEC v. Bennett, SEC Litigation Release No. 20660 (July 30, 2008) (barring Phillip 
Bennett--now in jail for sixteen years-from serving in the future as an officer or director of a public 
company). 
152. See, e.g., In re Madoff, Exchange Act Release No. 60118 (June 16, 2009) (barring Bernie 
Madoff---now in jail for 150 years-from serving as an investment adviser). 
153. See, e.g., SEC v. Bennett, supra note 151 (enjoining Phillip Bennett from future violations of 
the federal securities laws). 
154. See Thomas Gorman, Restoring SEC Enforcement: Prosecutorial Discretion and Coordination, 
SEC Actions, Apr. 20, 2009, http://www.secactions.cornf?p= I 029 (citing examples of where "there was no 
apparent need for the SEC to step in and investigate" and noting that "there are instances when it may be 
more prudent for the Commission to step back and conserve its resources, letting another agency take the 
lead."). 
155. See Khuzami, My First Hundred Days, supra note 25. 
156. And, if there is value in pursuing such sanctions, then Congress could easily provide that anyone 
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dismissing them when the defendant has become incapacitated is a very poor 
use of the Division's legal talents. 157 
VII. THE SEC SHOULD GATHER AND DISSEMINATE HONEST INFORMATION 
ABOUT THE IMPACT OF FRAUD IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 
The SEC currently dispenses information in an annual report, which is (as 
are most annual reports) self-serving and designed to obfuscate ugly truths. For 
example, in its nicely-titled Performance and Accountability Report for fiscal 
year 2008, we can see that, during that period, the SEC Enforcement Division 
initiated 671 enforcement actions-"the second highest number of 
enforcement actions in agency history"158-and "successfully resolved 92% 
of its cases."159 
This report does not tell us how much money was lost to Ponzi schemers 
in Fiscal Year 2008; how many SEC investigations ended up without further 
action because the defendant lives outside of the U.S. and cannot be located 
or served with process; where, geographically, the Ponzi schemers and their 
victims are located; the age and demographic characteristics of the victims; 
how many Enforcement cases involved documented recidivists; how many 
SEC investigations ended up in criminal referrals to the Justice Department; 
how many of those referrals hit a brick wall and were rejected for lack of 
evidence or lack of resources; how many criminal actions were successful and 
how much money was recovered in the form of restitution. The public is not 
told how much money was lost to Internet scams or to thieving brokers. 
Professor Don Langevoort has suggested that the SEC, like the brokerage 
industry, has a very good reason for not wanting to broadcast the scope of 
fraud in the securities markets.160 The SEC wants the public to believe the SEC 
is protecting them and that the securities markets offer a reasonably level 
who is imprisoned for securities fraud is automatically enjoined and/or barred. There are many models for 
such a statutory provision. See Jayne W. Barnard, The SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, 
76 TUL. L. REv. 1253, 1269 n.84 (2002) (describing automatic bar statutes triggered by a criminal 
conviction). 
157. See, e.g., SEC v. Dreier, SEC Litigation Release No. 20823 (Dec. 8, 2008)(announcing the filing 
of a civil action against lawyer accused of selling $113 million in bogus promissory notes). Dreier is now 
serving a twenty-year prison term. The SEC civil case is still pending. 
158. SEC ANN. PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REP., 2008, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
secpar/secpar2008.pdfflsec2, at 27. 
159. !d. 
160. Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The SEC and 
the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1139, 1165 (2003). 
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playing field. The fact is, however, that the market is rife with fraud and abuse. 
Just since January 2009, the Enforcement Division has filed more than forty 
cases involving Ponzi schemes or Ponzi-like payments. 161 Shouldn't the public 
demand some kind of "Ponzi Watch" website with information about these 
calamities? The public should know more about the kinds of"products" these 
Ponzi schemers are selling. The SEC should maintain a registry of Ponzi 
schemers as well as a running tab ofPonzi scheme losses. 162 
I might also make the case for an informed, aggressive media education 
campaign, much like that now utilized by the military services and some law 
enforcement agencies. It is now routine for journalists to be present in war 
zones or participate in ride-alongs . with local police officers. Some law 
enforcement agencies have even opened themselves up to reality TV. 163 Why 
not offer some version of that kind of media access at the SEC Enforcement 
Division? Why not encourage one of the crime-reenactment shows to 
reconstruct one of the most despicable affinity fraud schemes?164 
In fact, I will hold that thought for another occasion. For now, let me 
merely urge that the SEC provide much more candid and useful information 
about the nature and magnitude of the wrongdoing with which it deals every 
day. There is little value and much mischief in continuing to play hide-the-ball. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Let us conclude where we began-with the tumultuous year that gave rise 
to the election of a new President, the appointment a new SEC Chairman, a 
top-to-bottom shake-up of the Enforcement Division , and the discovery of 
some of the biggest and cruelest frauds in American history. 
The Enforcement Division has made admirable progress this year in 
confronting the need to update its priorities and enhance its workforce. The 
recommendations in this Article would further build on the progress the 
Division's new leaders have made to date. 
The challenge, of course, will be to keep the Division "nimble," and to 
maintain Enforcement's energy level well into the future. Whatever else 
161. Khuzami, My First Hundred Days, supra note 25. 
162. See Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, Dete"ence, supra note 122, at 225 (advocating for 
the creation of an online registry of Ponzi schemers, modeled on similar registries for sex offenders and 
physicians who have been disciplined for misconduct). 
163. See Wikipedia, COPS (TV series), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COPS_(TV _series). 
164. See, e.g., SEC v. Tri-Energy, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 21000 (Apr. 15, 2009)(describing 
a Ponzi scheme that raised $50 million through solicitations aimed at people who thought they were 
contributing to humanitarian causes). 
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Congress has to say about the SEC's future, the front-line soldiers in the 
SEC's Enforcement Division are our last best hope to ensure the protection of 
investors. 
